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In recent years the corporate form has been increasingly used by
professionals and other highly compensated individuals such as ath-
letes and entertainers to obtain federal income tax benefits unavailable
to sole proprietors or partners. The incentive for this type of planning
is the difference that exists in the Internal Revenue Code' in tax bene-
fits, primarily retirement benefits, available to employees versus self-
employed individuals. The Code establishes very favorable benefits for
qualified retirement plans such as Individual Retirement Accounts,
2
Keogh plans and corporate plans for employees. The tax benefits
available to all of these plans include current deductions for contribu-
tions with a deferral of taxation of the participant until subsequent re-
ceipt3 and the accumulation of earnings in the plans without a current
tax bite.4 Corporate plans have, however, been favored by profession-
als and similarly situated individuals because of the significantly
greater amounts which could be sheltered from taxes.
Following the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 5 for example, the maximum annual addi-
tion for a participant in a corporate defined contribution plan was
$25,000,6 whereas a Keogh plan participant was limited to a ceiling of
$7,500,' and Individual Retirement Accounts were limited to $1,500.8
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, as amended (hereinafter "I.R.C.").
2. I.R.C. § 408.
3. I.R.C. § 401, 404.
4. I.R.C. § 501(a).
5. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974).
6. I.R.C. § 415(c).
7. I.R.C. § 404(e)(1).
8. I.R.C. §§ 408(b), 219.
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Furthermore, there were other less significant, but nevertheless
favorable, attributes of corporate plans only.9
The self-employed highly compensated individual's only retire-
ment and current tax shelter plan choices are a Keogh plan or Individ-
ual Retirement Account.' ° These choices are, however, expanded to
include corporate plans if the individual forms a corporation and then
obtains employee status through being hired by the corporation. Fur-
thermore, there are other tax benefits, although not as significant as
retirement plans, available only in the corporate form.I' Changing to
employee status to obtain the attendant tax benefits was the sole reason
behind the formation of most professional corporations.' 2 This plan-
ning has recently gone to the extreme of partnerships of individual cor-
porations, thus allowing each professional to individually tailor the
retirement benefits and avoid providing these benefits to non-profes-
sionals in the group. 3
This type of creative tax planning for professionals and similarly
situated individuals has been dramatically altered by the recently en-
acted Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA").' 4
This article will detail the brief and colorful history of the professional
corporation, discuss the provisions of TEFRA relevant to this type of
planning, and explore the planning potentials left in the wake of
TEFRA.
HISTORY OF THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
The provisions of TEFRA applicable to professional corporations
and similar structures utilized by athletes and entertainers represent the
most recent salvo in the battled waged by the Internal Revenue Service.
An examination of the history of this planning vehicle, as shown by the
9. A corporate retirement plan participant may, for example, borrow from a corporate
retirement plan, (I.R.C. § 4975(d)(1)), although this has been somewhat limited by § 236 of
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which added subsection (p)(2) to
I.R.C. § 72.
10. Corporate retirement plan benefits are available only to employees, and sole propri-
etors and partners are not considered to be employees.
11. E.g., accident and health plans, (I.R.C. § 105); employees' death benefits, (I.R.C.
§ 101(b)); and the deferral potential available from a corporate fiscal year rather than a
calendar year. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-1(b)(3) (1960). See also [1982] 1 PROF. CORP. HAND-
BOOK (CCH) pp. 131-134.
12. [1977] 1 PROF. CORP. HANDBOOK (CCH) p. 115.
13. Kiddie v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 1055 (1978); Garland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 5
(1979). See infra pp. 109-111.
14. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1982).
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history of professional corporations, discloses a battle between the
Service and the individual taxpayer seeking to obtain and maximize
the tax benefits of the corporate form.
Ironically, it was the Internal Revenue Service that planted the
conceptual seed which sprouted into today's professional corporations.
This seed was planted in Morrissey v. Commissioner,5 in which the
Supreme Court confirmed the concept that an unincorporated entity
could, in certain settings, be treated as a corporation for income tax
purposes.
Morrissey involved a trust which was established for the develop-
ment of a golf course. The Court stated that an enterprise for the trans-
action of business is not the characteristic of an ordinary trust. In
confirming the so-called "corporate resemblance" test, the Court held
that the trust constituted an association which would be taxed as a cor-
poration. The Court identified the following features which made the
trust analogous to a corporation:
1. An association created for carrying on a business en-
terprise and sharing in its gains;
2. Centralized management assigned to the trustees;
3. Transferrable beneficial interests;
4. Continuity of the enterprise upon death of the own-
ers; and
5. Limited personal liability of the owners.' 6
The Supreme Court in Morrissey thus provided the conceptual
stepping-stone for professionals who sought corporate tax benefits but
had been denied the ability to achieve corporate status under state law.
Members of professions who were experiencing increasingly higher in-
come taxes desired the tax benefits resulting from pension and profit-
sharing plans, and other benefits which were available only to "em-
ployees." They thus began forming associations for the practice of
their professions, classified and treated themselves as employees of
their association and took the tax benefits available to that status. By
including in their articles of association the corporate attributes estab-
lished by Morrissey, the professionals sought to attain classification as
corporations for tax purposes.
The Treasury Department, taking an antagonistic turn, changed its
15. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
16. The existence of a corporate charter or Articles of Incorporation is not the key to
being taxed as a corporation under the Internal Revenue Code; rather, this treatment de-
pends upon the codified "resemblance test." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (1967).
1982]
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position with regard to tax treatment of these organizations. The De-
partment asserted that these professional associations should be re-
garded as partnerships for federal income tax purposes and were not
entitled to the tax benefits they sought to attain.'
7
This new position was tested in the landmark case of United States
v. Kintner. 8 In Kintner, the taxpayer doctor and seven other physi-
cians executed articles of association for the practice of medicine, thus
reorganizing a previous partnership. The articles included some of the
Morrissey criteria (i.e., continuity of life, a centralized management
consisting of 5 executive committee members, business purpose, net
earnings were divided among members, and partial limitation of liabil-
ity). The Court held that the association more nearly resembled a cor-
poration than a partnership and should be taxed as a corporation.' 9
Although under state law physicians were prohibited from practicing
medicine in the corporate form, the Court stated that classification for
federal tax purposes was a question of federal, not state, law.20
In 1960, after numerous similar defeats, the Treasury Department
responded to this judicial non-acceptance of its position by promulgat-
ing regulations which indirectly overturned the Kintner decision.2
These became known as the Kintner regulations because the purpose
behind them was obvious. The regulations were aimed at making it
impossible for unincorporated professional organizations to achieve
corporate status for federal income tax purposes. General tests were set
forth for determining conditions under which an association would be
considered to have the characteristics of a corporation. Fortunately for
17. While in Morrissey the Government argued in favor of taxing the trust as a corpora-
tion because it engaged in business as an association, the Government turned full circle with
regard to professionals. The Government took the position that if, under local law, profes-
sionals were not allowed to incorporate, then they could not be classified as associations for
income tax purposes regardless of their corporate characteristics. U.S. v. Kintner, 216 F.2d
418 (9th Cir. 1954).
18. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
19. " 'It is obvious from this record that petitioners' enterprise was carried on for profit,
and it is likewise clear that all the substantial points of resemblance to a corporation as
specified in the decisions mentioned were present in their organization. On the other hand,
substantial dissimilarities to the partnership form appear.'" U.S. v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418,
422 (9th Cir. 1954), quoting Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
20. "[I1t would introduce an anarchic element in federal taxation if we determined the
nature of associations by state criteria rather than by special criteria sanctioned by the tax
law, the regulations and the courts. It would destroy the uniformity so essential to a federal
tax system,-a uniformity which calls for equal treatment of taxpayers, no matter in what
state their activities are carried on. For it would mean that tax incidences as to taxpayers in
the same category would be determined differently according to the law of the state of resi-
dence." U.S. v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 424 (9th Cir. 1954).
21. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 and 301.7701-2; T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409.
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the professionals, the door was still open for states to enact legislation
enabling professionals to practice as corporations thus circumventing
the impact of the Kintner regulations.
Taxpayers did turn to the state legislatures for assistance in achiev-
ing corporate status. Many states responded by enacting statutes that
satisfied the 1960 regulations and permitted doctors, lawyers and other
professionals to form corporations for the practice of their specialties.2 2
By 1970, forty-nine states had enacted such statutes.
Predictably, the IRS retaliated in 1965 by amending the 1960 regu-
lations. The amendments required that the Morrissey resemblence test
be met by professional corporations regardless of state law.23 These
standards were virtually impossible to meet, 24 so the taxpayers again
took the IRS to court.
In U.S. v. Empey,25 the Appellate Court unanimously agreed that
the 1965 amendments were invalid. In Empey, the court held that in
taxing a professional association of lawyers as a partnership under the
1965 amendment, the IRS was being "unreasonable and inconsistent
with statutory definitions of 'partnership' and 'corporation'." The
IRS's undertaking to overturn these definitions in its regulations consti-
tuted "an attempt to legislate" and was therefore invalid.2 6
Empey was the first in a string of defeats for the IRS and its 1965
amendments.27 In each case, the amendments were held invalid and
the organization in question was held to be a corporation for federal
income tax purposes.
The only victory for the IRS was in Roubik v. Commissioner.28 In
that case, the Tax Court held that the professional corporation would
not be taxed as a corporation because it was a mere "skeleton." The
22. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 13400 et seq., cited as "Moscone-Knox Professional
Corporations Act," CONSOLIDATED LAW OF NEW YORK, Ch. 4, Art. 15, §§ 1501-1515; ILL.
REv. STATUTES, Ch. 32, § 415-1 et seq.
23. T.D. 6797, February 3, 1965, §§ 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-3.
24. The amended regulations required different standards for personal service organiza-
tions than for other corporations when determining tax treatment. While an organization
needed only to more nearly resemble a corporation than a partnership or trust to be taxed as
a corporation, (Treas. Reg. § 301.77012-2 (1960)), a personal service organization had much
stricter standards to meet. As stated by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Empey, "it is
fairly obvious that the purpose of the amendments of January 28, 1965, was to prevent a
professional service organization from being able to qualify as a corporation for tax pur-
poses under the Internal Revenue Code."
25. 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
26. U.S. v. Empey, 406 F.2d at 170.
27. See, e.g., Kurzner v. U.S., 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); O'Neill v. U.S., 410 F.2d 888
(6th Cir. 1969); Van Epps v. U.S., 301 F. Supp. 256 (D. Ariz. 1969).
28. 53 T.C. 365 (1969).
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corporation had no control over its "employees" who were merely en-
gaged in separate practice with centralized "corporate" bookkeeping.
Roubik is a classic blueprint of how not to operate a professional
corporation.
In 1969, the IRS finally conceded that professional organizations
formed under state incorporation laws would be taxed as corporations
for federal income tax purposes. 29 The reluctance on the part of gov-
ernment to concede to the professional taxpayers clearly echoes much
of the motivation behind certain provisions of TEFRA. This sentiment
was epitomized in the case of Dean P. Epperson 30 where a doctor prac-
ticing as a professional corporation sought review of a lower court rul-
ing based on prejudicial error. The trial court had upheld the
corporate status but also held that certain payments to the doctor were
taxable as dividend income and not loans. The error in question on
appeal concerned the closing argument by counsel for the Government.
He said, among other things:
We see no reason why a man who has as much money as Dr.
Epperson, who has more money than he can probably ever
spend, is entitled to ignore all the rules that everybody else
has to live by. . . . We say he is not entitled to a refund of
taxes because he hasn't paid his fair share . . . . Let's make
this doctor pay the kind of income taxes he ought to pay
... I am sick and tired, and I know you are, at having to
pay taxes at a rate when these rich people like to construe and
set up all these transactions to save taxes so they don't have to
pay any.
31
The Court of Appeals felt that although these words were in "bad
taste," they were not prejudicial to Dr. Epperson.
So in 1969, the Service accepted the concept of incorporated pro-
fessionals and, as in Roubik and Epperson, challenged only the utiliza-
tion of this form, rather than the form itself. As the IRS accepted the
corporate form for professionals, many of the professionals then at-
tempted to maximize the benefits of this form for themselves. The area
of controversy thus became discrimination in the qualified retirement
plans. As mentioned, the motivation for professionals and similarly
situated individuals to incorporate was the utilization of corporate, as
29. Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 C.B. 278, as subsequently amplified by Rev. Rul. 70-455,
1970-2 C.B. 297; Rev. Rul. 72-468, 1972-2 C.B. 647; Rev. Rul. 73-596, 1973-2 C.B. 424; and
Rev. Rul. 74-439, 1974-2 C.B. 405.
30. 490 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1973).
31. Id. at 100.
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opposed to IRA or Keogh, retirement plans. These corporate retire-
ment plans received favorable tax treatment only if they were qualified
under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.32 Qual-
ified status in large part depends upon compliance with the antidis-
crimination and coverage rules.33 The impact of the rules upon an
incorporated professional requires retirement plan coverage of most, if
not all, full-time non-professional employees of the corporation. Full-
time is liberally defined for these purposes as working or being paid for
1,000 or more hours during a twelve-month period or an average of
approximately 19 hours per week.34 Retirement plan coverage of the
non-professional corporate employees had the obvious effect of in-
creasing the cost to the professional of the corporate form, thus making
this form far less attractive to many professionals. Some professionals
attempted to avoid this cost impact through what they and their advi-
sors undoubtedly considered creative compliance with the antidis-
crimination rules. Revenue Ruling 73-477,35 for example, deals with an
attempt to share part-time employees rather than using full-time em-
ployees who would have to be covered under a qualified retirement
plan. The ruling's fact situation involved two professional corporations
which had separate medical practices but shared office facilities and the
professional services of two nurses. Each nurse worked as a part-time
employee for each corporation, but their total combined hours of work
per week was enough to be classified as a full-time employee for retire-
ment plan purposes. As a most effective solution to this attempt to
avoid retirement plan coverage of the nurses, the IRS ruled that both of
the nurses were full-time employees of each professional corporation.
The Service and the Department of the Treasury were quick to
move to a legislative solution when judicial or administrative measures
did not stop what the IRS considered an abuse of the antidiscrimina-
tion rules. Employee leasing from a related corporation is an example
of such an "abuse." This concept involved the formation of two corpo-
rations by the professional. One corporation was established to con-
duct the professional activity, and hired the licensed professionals as its
only employees. The other corporation ("service corporation") was not
established as a professional corporation, and hired the non-profes-
sional support personnel as its employees. The professionals owned the
controlling interests of each corporation. The professional corporation
32. I.R.C. §§ 401-415.
33. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4), (5), 410(b), see also, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-183, 1970-1 C.B. 103.
34. I.R.C. §§ 401(d)(3)(A), 410(a)(3).
35. 1973-2 C.B. 135.
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then contracted with the service corporation to retain the services of its
employees. As one might expect when reviewing this type of planning,
the professional corporation adopted very generous retirement plans
while the service corporation adopted sparse plans or none at all. The
professionals and other similarly situated individuals were thus able to
obtain all of the tax and financial benefits of incorporation and corpo-
rate qualified retirement plans without incurring the cost of providing
the same benefits to people who were, in truth, their employees.
The Service's response to employee leasing from a controlled cor-
poration was to seek and obtain a legislative solution. Congress, as
part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ER-
ISA"), added Sections 414(b) and (c) to the Internal Revenue Code.3 6
Under these subsections, the employees of a controlled group of corpo-
rations,37 such as commonly owned professional and service corpora-
tions, will be treated as if employed by one employer for purposes of
the coverage and antidiscrimination rules applicable to qualified retire-
ment plans. The Congressional intent behind these subsections was
clearly stated:
The [House Ways and Means] committee, by this provision,
intends to make it clear that the coverage and antidiscrimina-
tion provisions cannot be avoided by operating through sepa-
rate corporations instead of separate branches of one
corporation. For example, if managerial functions were per-
formed through one corporation employing highly compen-
sated personnel, which has a generous pension plan, and
assembly-line functions were performed through one or more
other corporations employing lower-paid employees, which
have less generous plans, or no plans at all, this would gener-
ally constitute an impermissible discrimination.38
This avenue of creative, and to some abusive, tax planning was
thus foreclosed to the incorporated professional. The unrelated em-
ployees leasing industry, however, received a real boost from these de-
velopments. When leasing employees from an unrelated company, the
professional transfers, on paper, his or her employees to the leasing
company, and these employees are then leased back to the professional.
Compensation and benefits are paid by the leasing company. The ben-
efits for these employees were often substantially less than the benefits
36. ERISA § 1015.
37. See Dunkle, Tax Court's Reading of 414(b) Endangers Controlled Group's Plans, 56 J.
TAX'N. 8 (1982).
38. CCH, PENSION REFORM ACT OF 1974, LAW AND EXPLANATION 39 (1974).
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provided to the employees of the professional corporation and thus a
significant cost savings was achieved. The impact of Sections 414(b)
and (c) was avoided because the leasing company and professional cor-
poration were not related in an ownership sense. Internal Revenue
Service action and certain provisions of TEFRA, however, have taken
most of the attractiveness out of this type of planning. 9
After the I.R.S. foreclosed employee sharing by Rev. Rul. 73-447
and Congress inhibited employee leasing from a related corporation by
the addition of Sections 414(b) and (c) to the Code, the professionals'
next tactic involved a slight variation of these concepts which was suc-
cessful in winding its way through IRS challenges in Tax Court. The
professionals formed partnerships of professional corporations or indi-
viduals and professional corporations.' Each principal or professional
who was a partner had a choice of occupying this capacity as an indi-
vidual or forming a corporation and plugging the corporation into his
or her slot as a partner in the partnership. Each corporation would
have only one employee, the professional, and adopt whatever quali-
fied retirement plans best suited that individual. The non-partners in
the structure were treated as employees of the partnership, and no pro-
vision was thereby made for them under the corporate partner's retire-
ment plans. The IRS was twice unsuccessful in challenging this
planning in Tax Court.4'
The first challenge was raised in Thomas Kiddie, M.D., Inc. v.
Commissioner .42 In this case, Dr. Kiddie formed a professional medi-
cal corporation in 1978 to provide pathological services to a hospital.
He then joined with another professional medical corporation to form a
partnership to provide medical services. Four additional doctors were
employed by the partnership and each corporation was a fifty percent
partner.
Dr. Kiddie's professional corporation adopted a defined benefit
plan which covered Dr. Kiddie as the sole corporate employee, without
covering any of the partnership employees. The IRS attacked the plan
as discriminatory, asserting a substance-over-form argument that the
partnership employees were actually employed by the professional cor-
porate partners for purposes of the antidiscrimination and coverage
rules. The Tax Court rejected this argument and held that the employ-
39. TEFRA § 248, adding subsection (n) to I.R.C. § 414.
40. Kiddie v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 1055 (1978); Garland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 5
(1979).
41. Id.
42. 69 T.C. 1055 (1978).
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ees were partnership employees and thus properly excluded from the
corporate retirement plan. Dr. Kiddie's professional corporation never
owned more than fifty percent of the partnership and therefore was
never in control of the partnership. It was this absence of control that
prevented the allocation of the partnership employees to the corporate
partners for purposes of the retirement plan qualification rules.43
The Service was not content to accept the Kiddie decision, and a
year later, resurrected the same issues before the Tax Court in Lloyd M.
Garland, M.D., FA. CS., P.A. v. Commissioner.' Dr. Garland had dis-
solved his partnership of individuals with another doctor, formed a
professional corporation, and his corporation formed a new partner-
ship with the previous partner. Dr. Garland was the sole employee of
the professional corporation. The corporation adopted qualified retire-
ment plans which, following their amendment to comply with ERISA,
covered only Dr. Garland and no employees of the partnership. Rec-
ognizing these facts as virtually identical to those in Kiddie, the Tax
Court stated:
[The Government] asks us to overrule our opinion in Kiddie,
supra, and hold that the employment relationship between
the partnership and its employees must be attributed to each
notwithstanding the possibility that his interest in partnership
profits or capital may not exceed fifty percent. We agree with
[Dr. Garland's professional corporation] .
45
Furthermore, in holding for Dr. Garland's professional corpora-
tion, the Tax Court also stated its opinion that Sections 414(b) and (c)
of the Code added by ERISA are the exclusive means for aggregating
employees of related buisness entities for the purpose of applying the
antidiscrimination rules. Thus faced with a judicial refusal to close
what it considered a gaping loophole, the Service again sought and ob-
tained a legislative solution.
Congress added Section 414(m) to the Code as part of the Miscel-
43. "Generally, attribution of partnership characteristics to a partner does not occur un-
less that partner controls the partnership. Although there is no universal definition, section
707(b) of subchapter K defines such control. . . . [A] partner owning more than a 50 per-
cent interest may not recognize a loss which arose in dealings between such partner and the
partnership ....
"We find the greater than 50 percent interest test ... to be equally applicable in defin-
ing control of a partnership for purposes of Section 401(a)(3)." Kiddie v. Commissioner, 69
T.C. 1055, 1060 (1978).
44. 73 T.C. 5 (1979).
45. Id. at I1-12.
[Vol. 2
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laneous Revenue Act of 1980.46 The specific purpose of this Section is
to expand the "aggregation web" of Sections 414(b) and (c), and re-
verse the results of the Kiddie and Garland decisions.47 Section 414(m)
introduces the "affiliated service group" ("ASG") as the solution to the
Kiddie-Garland abuses. In an ASG, corporations and partnerships are
aggregated based upon common or interlocking ownership and simi-
larity of services rendered.48 A law or medical partnership with one or
more professional corporate partners, such as the structure in Garland,
would result in the partnership and corporations being aggregated as
one affiliated service group. 49 The impact of this classification is that all
employees of the members of an affiliated service group are considered
to be employed by one employer for the purposes of satisfying the an-
tidiscrimination rules. Section 414(m) does not prevent the profes-
sional's use of a Kiddie-Garland type partnership of professional
corporations; rather, it merely requires that retirement benefits compa-
rable to those provided to the professionals in the group be provided to
all eligible employees. The Service has provided detailed guidelines
for determining comparability of benefits of this situation.5"
46. Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, 94 Stat. 3521 (1980).
47. See Maldonado, Comparability of Contributions or Benefits Under Different Plans, 55
J. TAX'N. 364 (1981).
48. The definition of an Affiliated Service Group ("ASG") includes a service organiza-
tion and any other organization if a significant portion of the business of the other organiza-
tions is to perform services for the service organization in the same field and 10% or more of
the other organizations is owned by officers, highly compensated employees or owners of the
service organization.
The Internal Revenue Service presented the following example of an ASG consisting of
corporations A, B and C and partnership P. The result of this classification is that all em-
ployees of A, B, and C and P are considered as employed by a single employer for purposes
of the qualified plan antidiscrimination rules of I.R.C. Section 410(b).
"P, a law partnership consists of corporate partners A, B, C and 10 individual
partners. Each of the partners owns less than 10% of the partnership. The partner-
ship employs as common law employees some lawyers, paralegals, and clerical em-
ployees. The partnership has a qualified plan, Plan P, covering some but not all of
the common law employees. Corporations A and B each have only one employee,
the sole shareholder. Corporation A maintains a retirement plan, Plan A. Corpo-
ration B maintains no plan. Corporation C employs the sole shareholder, a lawyer
employee, and three clerical employees. Corporation C maintains a retirement
plan, Plan C, for all its employees. Corporations A, B, and C regularly perform
services for P. No individual is a participant in more than one plan and none of
the statutory exclusions of Section 410(b) applies." Rev. Rul. 81-105, 1981-12
I.R.B. 27; See also, Gehring, Rev. Ru. 81-105 and the Use ofProfessional Service
Corporation Partnerships After the Enactment of Code Sec. 414(m), 59 TAXES 371
(1981).
49. Rev. Rul. 81-202, 1981-2 C.B. 93.
50. Id.
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The Impact of TEFRA
The scenario does not end with Section 414(m), however, as the
recently enacted TEFRA provisions sound the death knell for new pro-
fessional corporations by removing the economic incentives previously
present in this type of planning. The major effect of TEFRA in this
area is to create parity between corporate retirement plans and Keogh
plans, thus removing the major economic incentive for incorporating.5'
For years beginning after 1983, TEFRA eliminates almost all dis-
tinctions between corporate qualified deferred compensation plans and
plans of self-employed individuals (Keogh Plans).52
Under prior law, corporate retirement plans were particularly at-
tractive to highly compensated individuals because of the significant
amount of "shelterable" compensation. Maximum annual contribu-
tions to a profit-sharing or other defined contribution plans were the
lesser of twenty-five percent of compensation or $45,475.53 Contribu-
tions to Keogh Plans, on the other hand, were limited to $15,000 per
year.54 TEFRA equalizes these plans by limiting both corporate de-
fined contribution plans and Keogh Plans to a maximum contribution
of $30,000 per year.55 In addition, while a corporate defined benefit
plan could fund for a maximum annual pension of $136,425, TEFRA
limits this amount to $90,000 per year.56 Although these limits on cor-
porate plan contributions and benefits will impact "only very highly
compensated employees, other changes in corporate plan structure will
make them less attractive to everyone.
Prior to the passage of TEFRA, defined benefit plans could in-
crease today's contribution by setting the retirement age at 55. The
earlier the date of retirement, the larger the contributions presently re-
quired to meet annual benefit amounts for years between retirement
age and actuarially-determined date of death.57 TEFRA changes this
manipulation of benefits by retirement date by requiring that the
amount of contributions for plans beginning before age 62 be reduced
51. Employee Benefit Provisions of Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Special Sup-
plement, BNA Daily Tax Reports (Oct. 2, 1982).
52. TEFRA §§ 237-239, amending I.R.C. §§ 401, 404, 1379, 4972.
53. I.R.C. § 415(c).
54. I.R.C. § 404(e).
55. TEFRA § 235, amending I.R.C. § 415(c)(1) and TEFRA § 238, amending I.R.C.
§ 404(e).
56. TEFRA § 235, amending I.R.C. § 415(b)(1).
57. Assuming a male age 35 in a defined benefit plan set to produce a $90,000 per year
retirement benefit, the contributions required for various normal retirement dates are the
following:
[Vol. 2
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actuarially to the equivalent of the contributions for benefits beginning
at age 62.58
The Act also adds provisions defining and regulating a so-called
"Top Heavy Plan."59 Generally, a Top Heavy Plan is one in which 60
percent of the account balances (for a defined contribution plan) are
held for the benefit of the key owners or officers of the organization.
60
The majority of professional and one-man corporation retirement
plans will most likely be considered "Top Heavy" under TEFRA. 61 A
plan classified as Top Heavy must provide a faster vesting schedule
62
than non-Top Heavy Plans and most accrue or contribute certain mini-
mum non-integrated amounts for the non-key employees.
63
Besides the opportunity of sheltering large amounts of compensa-
tion as contributions, corporate plans were also attractive because par-
ticipants could borrow from them.' TEFRA specifically limits this
borrowing option by providing that all loans from qualified retirement
plans above a specified amount will be treated as taxable gain to the




If the male is age 45 when he enters the same plan, then the comparable numbers are:




These computations are based upon a 5.5% earnings assumption and are for Straight
Line annuity-1951 Group Annuity (Projection C to 55) post retirement interest 3.5%.
[Computations supplied by Liden, Cogan & Assoc., Canoga Park, California].
58. TEFRA § 235(e), amending I.R.C. § 415(b)(2).
59. I.R.C. § 416, as added by TEFRA § 240.
60. I.R.C. § 416(i).
61. This stems from the planning for most professional type corporations, in which one
of the primary goals is to allocate, within permissible limits, the bulk of the retirement con-
tributions to the key owners or officers.
62. I.R.C. Code Section 411 (a) provides the minimum vesting alternatives for a non-Top
Heavy plan of: (1) full vesting within ten years ("cliff vesting"); (2) five to fifteen year vest-
ing ("graded vesting"); or (3) generally when years of service plus age equal forty-five, the
participant must be at least fifty percent vested ("Rule of 45"). If, however, the plan is Top
Heavy, then it must use either of the following faster vesting schedules: (1) three year full
vesting; or (2) two to six year graded vesting (I.R.C. § 416(b)).
63. For a defined benefit plan, generally this minimum is the accrual of a benefit equal
to two percent of the employee's average compensation multiplied by the employee's years
of service, with a twenty percent maximum. For a defined contribution plan, generally the
non-integrated minimum contribution is three percent of the employee's compensation.
I.R.C. §§ 416(c)(1), (2).
64. I.R.C. § 4975(d).
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participant in the year of the loan.65 The Act does, however, allow
participants to borrow up to one-half of their vested benefits or $50,000,
whichever number is lower. These limitations apply to the total of al
loans which the participant has outstanding in his or her retirement
plans. Any loans which are taken from the plans must be repayable
within five years of the loan and, in fact, be repaid within this time.
There is a waiver of this five year repayment requirement if the loan is
used to acquire, construct, reconstruct or substantially rehabilitate the
participant's principal residence or the principal residence of a member
of the participant's family. These rules were effective August 13, 1982.
TEFRA does not change the prohibition of loans from Keogh plans.66
TEFRA also has a devastating impact on individuals who formed
their own corporations and sold their services to their employer-corpo-
ration or partnership. While this type of planning was initially ap-
proved by the Tax Court in Keller v. Commissioner,67 the IRS fought
back accordingly with the addition of new Section 269A to the Internal
Revenue Code.6 8 In Keller, one doctor in a partnership of physicians
substituted his newly-formed professional corporation for himself as
partner in the partnership. He was therefore an employee of Keller,
Inc., which became the partner in the partnership. He received his sal-
ary from the corporation, which also provided the benefits of corporate
retirement plans. The IRS attacked Dr. Keller's arrangement under
the allocation of income doctrine. 69 This doctrine allows the Commis-
sioner to allocate income among related taxpayers (here, the corpora-
tion and its employee) to prevent the evasion of taxes or to clearly
reflect the income of each taxpayer's business activities. The Tax Court
held that this doctrine applies to the one-man professional service cor-
poration, but does not authorize allocation which would disregard the
existence of the corporation. Thus, because Dr. Keller had followed
corporate formalities, was conducting a business, and had satisfied the
65. Supra note 9.
66. I.R.C. §§ 4975(d), 401(c)(3).
67. 77 T.C. 1014 (1981).
68. TEFRA § 250, adding I.R.C. § 269A.
69. "ALLOCATION OF INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS AMONG TAXPAYERS.
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not imorporated,
whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) ofied or con-
trolled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion,
or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organi-
zations, trades, or business, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or alloca-
tion is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of
such organizations, trades, or businesses." I.R.C. § 482.
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arms-length test with regard to employment by the corporation, there
would be no allocation of income under Section 482.
This victory was short-lived however. Section 269A of TEFRA
was specifically aimed at Keller-type situations and will no doubt affect
incorporated professionals, business consultants, technical specialists,
sports stars and TV personalities. The very broad language of this sec-
tion defines a "personal service corporation," and is aimed at anyone
who performs substantially all services for one partnership or corpora-
tion. In such cases the IRS may choose to ignore the corporate form
for tax purposes, thus subjecting the owner-employee to individual tax
liability. The Section was intended to reach situations "where the cor-
poration served no meaningful business purpose other than to secure
tax benefits which would not otherwise be available."70 It was not
aimed at smaller incorporated firms or incorporated sole practitioners
performing services for a wide range of clientele. The focus of Section
269A is on the "personal service corporation" ("PSC") which is a cor
poration that primarily renders personal services which are substan-
70. Referring to the provisions of I.R.C. § 269A, the following was issued by the House
Ways and Means Committee:
"The conferees intend that the provisions overturn the results reached in cases like Kel-
ler v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), where the corporation served no meaningful busi-
ness purpose other than to secure tax benefits which would not otherwise be available."
CHH, TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 at 311 (1982).
"SEC. 269A. PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS FORMED OR AVAILED
OF TO AVOID OR EVADE INCOME TAX.
"(a) GENERAL RULE.-if-
"(1) substantially all of the services of a personal service corporation are per-
formed for (or on behalf of) 1 other corporation, partnership, or other entity, and
"(2) the principal purpose of forming, or availing of, such personal service cor-
poration is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax by reducing the income of, or
securing the benefit of any expense, deduction, credit, exclusion, or other allowance for, any
employee-owner which would not otherwise be available, then the Secretary may allocate all
income, deductions, credits, exclusions, and other allowance between such personal service
corporation and its employee-owners, if such allocation is necessary to prevent avoidance or
evasion of Federal income tax or clearly to reflect the income of the personal service corpo-
ration or any of its employee-owners.
"(b) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-
"(I) PERSONAL SERVICE CORPORATION.-The term 'personal service
corporation' means a corporation, the principal activity of which is the performance of per-
sonal services and such services are substantially performed by employee-owners.
"(2) EMPLOYEE-OWNER.-The term 'employee-owner' means any employee
who owns, on any day during the taxable year, more than 10 percent of the outstanding
stock of the personal service corporation. For purposes of the preceding sentence, section
318 shall apply, except that '5 percent' shall be substituted for '50 percent' in Section
318(a)(2)(C).
"(3) RELATED PERSONS.-AII related persons (within the meaning of Sec-
tion 103(b)(6)(c)) shall be treated as one entity."
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tially performed by its owner-employees. 71 Owner-employee is defined
as any employee who owns more than ten percent of the outstanding
stock on any one day during the corporation's fiscal year. 2 The reallo-
cation of income or deductions concept of Section 269A is only acti-
vated if the PSC renders substantially all of its services to one other
corporation, partnership or other entity.73 Section 269A would there-
fore apply to the incorporated doctor or lawyer, whose corporation is a
partner in the practice partnership, as in Kiddie74 and Garland.71 It
would also cover the incorporated athlete under contract to one club or
the incorporated director or actor under contract to one studio. Any
professional or similar type corporation which provided services to
multiple clients would not, however, fall under the cloud of Section
269A.
Section 269A takes effect for taxable years beginning after Decem-
ber 31, 1982, but the Keogh Plan parity provisions of TEFRA are not
effective until 1984. These staggered effective dates create uncertainty
regarding a PSC's retirement plan status during 1983. Section 269A is
directed at "securing the benefit of any expense, deduction, credit, ex-
clusion, or other allowance for, any employee-owner which would not
otherwise be available (outside the corporate form)."' 76 As discussed,
prior to TEFRA the primary purpose in professional corporation type
planning was the utilization of corporate retirement plans, or, in other
words, securing the benefit of the deductions which would not be avail-
able to the owner-employee outside the corporate form. This advan-
tage of the corporate form will cease in 1984 when the Keogh parity
provisions become effective; however, this advantage will still be avail-
able during 1983. The availability of this corporate form advantage
prior to the effective date of TEFRA's Keogh parity provisions is what
creates the uncertainty regarding 1983. This uncertainty seems, how-
ever, to have been eliminated by Senate Finance Committee Chairman
Robert Dole, who stated:
I want to make it clear that under the conference agreement
[TEFRA] a personal service corporation will not be consid-
ered to be formed or availed of for the purpose of evading or
avoiding federal income tax solely because, for 1983, the
71. I.R.C. § 269A(b)(l).
72. I.R.C. § 269A(b)(2).
73. I.R.C. § 269A(a)(1).
74. Supra note 39.
75. Id.
76. I.R.C. § 269A(a)(2).
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qualified plan rules will permit higher contributions and other
advantages for corporate employees in applying Section
269A. Thus, the Secretary of the Treasury will not take a cor-
poration's retirement plan into account.
77
Senator Dole's intent and interpretation on this point has been
confirmed by a senior official of the Department of the Treasury. 8
Thus, for purposes of Section 269A, the tax benefits that would be
available only in corporate form (and therefore at risk) do not include
retirement plans, but would include any of the following used by a
PSC: medical expense reimbursement plans;79 group term life insur-
ance;8" deferral of taxable gain through a staggered corporate fiscal
year; and accumulation of taxable income at lower corporate rates.8'
With Section 269A creating a risk in using these secondary benefits
in a PSC, and TEFRA bringing parity to corporate and non-corporate
retirement plans, the economic incentives for most PSCs has been
eliminated.
PSCs do, however, still serve a useful purpose in certain limited
situations. A law firm or medical group with a significant age spread
among its partners will, for example, still benefit from this planning.
The benefit is derived from the different characteristics of defined bene-
fit plans versus defined contribution plans, the two major types of cor-
porate retirement plans available.82 By using a Kiddie-Garland type
partnership of professional corporations, each partner could form his
or her own corporation and substitute the corporation in his or her
place as the partner in the partnership. Of course, a comparable retire-
77. 97 Cong. Rec. S-10903 (1982).
78. See, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1982 at I (Tax Report).
79. Corporations may adopt these plans to cover employees for medical expenses in-
curred by them and their dependents. I.R.C. § 162(a) makes corporate contributions to
these plans deductible by the corporation and under I.R.C. § 106 they are not taxable to the
employee.
80. I.R.C. § 79; see also, Lewis, Group Term Life Insurance--Section 79-TEFRA
Changes, COMPENSATION PLAN J. 3 (January 1983).
81. For example, a married individual filing a joint return with $50,000 in taxable in-
come owes $14,778 in Federal income tax and is in the 49% tax bracket. A corporation with
the same taxable income, however, owes only $8,750 in income tax and is in the 30% bracket
(I.R.C. §§ l(a), 11).
82. Defined benefit plans are funded based upon a pre-determined goal (e.g. 50% of
compensation as a pension). The older an individual entering this type of plan, the greater
the contribution required because there are fewer years until retirement. Defined contribu-
tion plans (e.g. profit-sharing plans) are based on the total of each year's contribution plus
earnings and operate without a fix pre-determined retirement goal. Younger individuals
therefore tend to prefer defined contribution plans, while older individuals tend to favor
defined benefit plans.
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ment plan would also have to be adopted to cover the employees of the
partnership. 3 This type of planning offers the benefits of allowing
each partner to tailor a retirement package that best fits his or her age,
tax planning, and retirement goals. Furthermore, each partner would
have total control of the plan assets, and complete portability of bene-
fits should he or she leave the group. In many situations, the advan-
tages of this type of planning should outweigh the cost of creating the
structure, or the risks upon fringe benefits caused by the PSC
classification.
Professional corporation type planning has had a relatively short,
but colorful history to date. TEFRA has not, however, rendered this
planning extinct. Professional and similar type corporations which do
not fit within the PSC classification are unaffected by Section 269A.
Much of the economic incentive behind the choice of this form has
been removed by the TEFRA concept of corporate retirement plan -
Keogh parity; however, the other benefits available only in the corpo-
rate form" will, in many cases, still justify its use. Furthermore, even a
PSC may serve a useful purpose in the limited settings which were
noted. Although TEFRA does have a substantial impact upon profes-
sional and similar type corporations, it did not write the final chapter
for this planning.
Authors' Note
Immediately prior to publication, the Department of the Treasury
issued proposed regulations under Section 269A of the Code. The pro-
posed regulations confirm the authors' interpretation of the Section
269A impact upon qualified retirement plans (supra p. 214). The pro-
posed regulations also create a safe harbor from Section 269A if the tax
avoidance involved is minimal. Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.269A-1, 48 Fed.
Reg. 13438 (3/31/83).
83. This is required because of I.R.C. § 414(m) which was added to the Code to elimi-
nate the discrimination problem in Kiddie-Garland type situations, supra pp. 109-111.
84. Supra notes 79-81.
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